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L Introduction
In an increasingly global marketplace, in which international economic
transactions are growing in prominence, there is greater potential for suits
involving foreign parties and governments.1 Technological advancements
and transportational improvements are making the world a much smaller
place, further increasing overall levels of contact between private parties and
the governments of foreign nations.2 These heightened levels of interaction
and the corresponding increase in potential litigation between private parties
and foreign entities have created a greater need for unifomity and predict-
ability in the law of sovereign immunity? Foreign state enterprises engage
in commercial activities with U.S. businesses and corporations on a daily
basis.' In the event of a foreign government's breach of contract, such U.S.
businesses and corporations would need to know the requirements for seeking
redress in domestic courts.' For example, U.S. businesses may seek judicial
recourse to settle price disputes concerning goods sold to foreign state trading
companies." An American property owner who sells real estate to a foreign
government entity may desire to sue the foreign government entity in the
event of a breach of the contract of sale.' A U.S. motorist injured in a traffic
accident involving a foreign embassy's vehicle may seek recovery for dam-
ages in a local court.8 There are numerous examples of such litigation
between private parties and foreign governments.9 Such litigation often
1. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7,9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6604,
6605-07 (providing congressional rationale underlying codification of U.S. substantive
sovereign immunity law).
2. See Virginia Morris, The International Law Commission's Draft Convention on the
JurisdictionalImmunities ofStates and Their Property, 17 DENV. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 395, 395
(1989) (noting increased interaction between private parties and foreign states). In her article,
Morris discussed the development of sovereign immunity law in the United States and the role
of the International Law Commission in the codification and development of customary
international law. Id.
3. See id. (examining ramifications of increased interaction between private parties and
foreign states).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605 (providing examples of increased interaction between domestic entities and foreign states).
5. See Morris, supra note 2, at 395 (examining ramifications of increased interaction
between private entities and foreign states).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6604,
6605 (contemplating manner of litigation likely to result from increased interaction between
domestic entities and foreign states).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Soudavar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 186 F.3d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing shareholder suit against Islamic Republic of Iran for expropriation and national-
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involves the issue of whether the foreign sovereign is immune from domestic
adjudication.1"
The doctrine of sovereign immunity conceptualizes the fundamental
principle of international law that the foreign government of a nation, state,
political subdivision, or agent or instrumentality thereof shall not be sub-
jected to domestic adjudication without the foreign govertnment's consent.'
Sovereign immunity is different from diplomatic immunity.' 2 Under diplo-
ization of shareholder's corporation); In re Tamimi, 176 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 1999) (dis-
missing plaintiff's garnishment claim against Saudi state-owned airline that employed plaintiff's
spouse); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.
1985) (affirming grant of McDonnell Douglas's motion for summary judgment in declaratory
action that McDonnell Douglas did not breach basic ordering agreement to sell military aircraft
parts to Iran when McDonnell Douglas complied with United States Air Force order to cease
shipment of parts after Islamic takeover of Iranian Republic); MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic
of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Bangladesh possessed
sovereign immunity from Oregon corporation's suit for wrongful termination of licensing
agreement for export of rhesus monkeys); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 791-93
(2d Cir. 1984) (involving suit by personal representatives of former Chilean ambassador and
his aide against Republic of Chile and Chilean intelligence agency for car bomb assassination
of decedents); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1023-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(concerning Massachusetts plaintiff's suit against Republic of Ireland and three Irish corpora-
tions for allegedly stealing plaintiff's expertise and equipment and unjustly profiting therefrom);
Perez v. The Bahamas, 652 F.2d 186, 188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction appellant's cause of action for injuries incurred when Bahamian governmental
gunboats fired upon appellant's fishing vessel in Bahamian territorial waters); Sugarman v.
Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding Mexican government-owned
airline not immune from American passenger's suit alleging injuries suffered during extended,
unanticipated, and unexplained delay); Greenpeace, Inc. (U.SA.) v. State of France, 946 F.
Supp. 773,777,790 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing without prejudice environmental group's suit
against France for seizure of vessels, Rainbow Warrior II and M/V Greenpeace, during protest
of French nuclear testing); Berdakin v. Consulado De La Republica De El Salvador, 912 F.
Supp. 458, 460 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (involving lessor's suit against consulate of El Salvador and
its Consul General for breach of commercial contract); Sales v. Republic of Uganda, 828 F.
Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (considering construction worker's claims against Republic
of Uganda for injuries incurred when construction worker fell from ladder while working at
Ugandan Mission); Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (E.DN.Y.
1979) (dismissing plaintiff's suit against two Russian state-owned travel agencies and U.S.S.R.
to recover damages for alleged wrongful death of American tourist in Moscow hotel fire on
grounds that U.S.S.R. was immune from suit under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)).
10. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their
Corporations: Sovereign Immunity, Part I, 85 CoM. L.J. 167 (1980) (discussing implications
of sovereign immunity in suits against foreign governments and their state-owned corporations).
11. See Thomas 11 Hill, A Policy Analyis of the American Law of Foreign State
Immunily, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 158 (1981) (analyzing basic conceptual framework of
sovereign immunity law).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, atS (1976),reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6604,6606-
07 (providing background of U.S. sovereign immunity law).
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matic immunity, the sending nation's diplomatic agent is immune from the
civil jurisdiction of the receiving state and shall not be compelled to give
evidence as a witness. 3 The sending state may waive its diplomatic agent's
immunity only through an express waiver. 4 Sovereign immunity is also
different from head of state immunity, which involves the immunity from suit
of a foreign government's legitimate and constitutional leadership. 5
Under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 6 foreign
governments are entitled to sovereign immunity from suit unless one of the
FSIA's exceptions allows a U.S. court to assert jurisdiction. 7 One such
exception is waiver of immunity.'8 The FSIA provides in pertinent part that
the government of a foreign nation shall not be immune from litigation in the
courts of the United States or in the courts of any of its individual states when
the foreign government either expressly or implicitly waives its sovereign
immunity.' 9 Such an expressed or implied waiver is valid even though the
foreign government may attempt to withdraw the waiver at a later date, unless
such withdrawal complies with the terms of the original waiver of immu-
nity.2" The Supreme Court generally has defined waiver as "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."'" For a court
to give effect to an explicit waiver, the waiver must express the "'clear,
complete, unambiguous, and unmistakable"' manifestation of the foreign
sovereign's intent to waive its immunity.'
13. See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 798-800 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(considering whether Philippine solicitor general is diplomatic agent and thus entitled to
diplomatic immunity).
14. Id.
15. See United States v, Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that deposed Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega was not entitled to head of state immunity
from U.S. prosecution for his alleged cocaine trafficking activities); see also Marcos, 665 F.
Supp. at 797-98 (examining whether Philippine solicitor general was entitled to head of state
immunity).
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,1602-1611 (1994).
17. See id. § 1605 (providing general exceptions to jurisdictional immunity of foreign
state from U.S. domestic litigation).
18. See id. § 1605(aXl) (stating that "foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States or of the States in any me... in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication").
19. Id.
20. See id. (providing that expressed or implied waiver of sovereign immunity is valid
"notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver").
21. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (defining waiver).
22. See Aquamar, S-.A v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA_, 179 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th
Cir. 1999) (discussing requirements for validity of express waiver) (quoting Aquinda v. Texaco,
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In the international arena, ambassadors traditionally have possessed
broad powers to bind the governments they represent.23 Such powers include
the authority to represent the official position of the ambassador's nation
before foreign tribunals and to waive or assert sovereign immunity from
suit.24 At least one U.S. court has held that domestic tribunals should pre-
sume that foreign ambassadors possess authority to appear before them and
waive their nation's sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence to the
contrary.' Ambassadorial waiver of a foreign nation's sovereign immunity
to domestic adjudication in United States courts is therefore an important
issue because it significantly impacts a foreign government's amenability to
suit in a United States forum.2
This Note addresses what standards a U.S. court should use in determin-
ing whether a foreign ambassador possesses authority to waive the sovereign
immunity of the nation the ambassador represents in domestic adjudication
before U.S. courts. Part II of this Note begins with an examination of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity from its origins in early American jurispru-
dence to its contemporary policy rationales.27 Part III explores the legislative
history of the FSIA,1 with particular emphasis on congressional policies
underlying enactment of the statute. 9 Part IV examines recent case law
involving ambassadorial waivers of sovereign immunity.3" Part V analyzes
this case law in light of the underlying policies of the FSIA.3' Finally, Part
VI concludes by recommending a rule that U.S. courts should presume that
foreign ambassadors possess authority to waive their nations sovereign
immunity from suit in domestic litigation absent compelling evidence to the
contrary.
32
Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting cases), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)).
23. See id. at 1296 (analyzing traditional ambassadorial authority).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1299 (holding that under FSIA courts should presume ambassador possesses
authority to waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence making it obvious
ambassador does not possess such authority).
26. See id. at 1293-99 (exploring approaches to and analyzing dynamics of ambassadorial
waiver of foreign nation's sovereign immunity from domestic adjudication).
27. See infra Part II (discussing doctrine of sovereign immunity).
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994).
29. See infra Part TI (discussing legislative history and underlying policies of FSIA).
30. See infra Part IV (examining ambassadorial power to waive sovereign immunity
through case law study).
31. See infra Part V (analyzing case law in light of underlying policies of FSIA).
32. See infra Part VI (recommending that courts should presume ambassador possesses
authority to waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence to contrary).
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ff. Sovereign Immunity
In the international arena, the doctrine of sovereign immunity embodies
the fundamental principle that the government of a nation, state, political
subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality thereof may not be subject to
domestic adjudication without its consent.3 Subject to certain exceptions and
qualifications, a private litigant generally may not compel an immune foreign
sovereign to adjudicate claims against it, regardless of the legitimacy of the
litigant's claims or the wrongfulness of the foreign sovereign's conduct
giving rise to those claims.34 The principle of sovereign immunity is based
upon the notions of the sovereign independence of states and the equality and
dignity of coequal sovereigns."5 The sovereign immunity doctrine originated
in an era of personal sovereignty, when kings could theoretically do no wrong
and when the exercise of authority by one sovereign over another signified
hostility or superiority.36 "Because all nations are considered equal, one for-
eign state cannot exercise its sovereign power over another."37 Additionally,
nations traditionally have been reluctant to adjudicate claims against foreign
states for fear of detrimentally impacting valuable economic and political ties
with those foreign states. 8
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has become part of the very fabric
of U.S. law.39 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court made the earliest judicial pro-
nouncement of the sovereign immunity doctrine by the highest court of any
nation.4" In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,4 Chief Justice Marshall
advanced the classic formulation of sovereign immunity in the international
33. See Ill, supra note 11, at 158 (analyzing conceptual framework of sovereign im-
munity law).
34. See id.
35. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity in Perspective, 19 VAND. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 1, 1-2 (1986) (analyzing history and codification of sovereign immunity in national
and international law).
36. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General deAbastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354,357 (2d Cir. 1964) (examining historical origination of sovereign immunity concept).
37. See Catherine M. Beresovski, A Proposal to Deny Foreign Sovereign Immunity to
Nations Sponsoring Terrorism, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 77, 86 (1990) (suggesting that
nations should re-examine sovereign immunity doctrine in context of political terrorism so that
legitimate claims under international law may be satisfied).
38. See id. (analyzing underlying policies of sovereign immunity doctrine).
39. See Kevin F. Cook, Counting the Dragon's Teeth: Foreign Sovereign Immunity and
ItsImpact on InternationalAviation Litigation, 46 J.AIRL. & CoM. 687,690(1981) (exploring
historical background of U.S. sovereign immunity doctrine).
40. See Riesenfeld, supra note 35, at 2 (discussing history of sovereign immunity doc-
trine).
41. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
650
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legal system." Marshall reasoned that the principle of sovereign immunity
was based on the presumed independence, equality, and dignity of sovereign
nations." Although the nations of the world possessed exclusive and abso-
lute sovereignty within their territorial boundaries, they mutually agreed to
relinquish their sovereignty to a certain extent in respect of the sovereignty
of coequal states.' Because the world's nations were regarded as equals in
the international arena, one nation could not adjudicate the rights of another
nation without implying superiority over the adjudicated nation and thus
degrading that nation's dignity as a coequal sovereign." Finally, Marshall
reasoned that nations that sent their official representatives abroad did not
intend to subject them to the authority of the receiving state.4" If the receiv-
ing state subjected another nation's foreign ministers to its authority, the
foreign representatives would owe their temporary allegiance to the receiving
state and lack the requisite independence to represent their own country's
national interests adequately.'
The contemporary policy rationales underlying the doctrine of sovereign
immunity have transformed significantly since Chief Justice Marshall's opin-
ion in The SchoonerExchange.4  Although equality and respect amongnations
42. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,144 (1812) (con-
cluding that French military vessel docked in Philadelphia port was immune from suit in ad-
miralty attachment proceeding). In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall considered
"whether an American citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to an armed national
vessel, found within the waters of the United States." Id. at 135. After experiencing rough seas,
the French warship Sieur Begon sought refuge and repairs in the port of Philadelphia. Id. at 118.
Plaintiffs attempted to attach the Sieur Begon while it was docked in Philadelphia's harbor. Id.
at 117. Plaintiffs alleged that they were the true owners of the schooner, formerly known as the
"Exchange." Id. Plaintiffs further alleged that French government f~rces, following the orders
of Emperor Napoleon, forcibly and unlawfully seized the Exchange while in route to Spain. Id.
In concluding that the French warship was immune from suit in the attachment proceedings,
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the world was composed of distinct and independent
sovereigns which possessed equal rights. Id. at 136. Marshall recognized that nations exercised
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction within their own territorial boundaries. Id. Citing the foreign
policy considerations underlying head of state and diplomatic immunity, Marshall reasoned that
governments frequently relaxed their absolute and exclusive territorial sovereignty to promote
international relations with foreign states through the "interchange of those good offices which
humanity dictates and its wants require." Id. at 136.
43. See id. (developing fundamental framework of sovereign immunity analysis).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 137; see also Hill, supra note 11, at 163 (analyzing policy considerations under-
lying Supreme Court's opinion in The SchoonerExchange).
46. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 139 (exploring policies supporting
sovereign immunity doctrine).
47. Id.
48. See Hill, supra note 11, at 165 (discussing modem policy concerns behind sovereign
immunity doctrine); J. S. Davidson, State Immunity in the English Courts: A LingeringDeath,
33 N. I& LEGAL Q. 171,171 (1982) (same).
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were essential for political stability during the time of Marshall's opinion, the
modem policy considerations underlying sovereign immunity focus on the
mutual protection of "essential governmental functions from harassing and
interfering litigation."49 A government's military, economic, and political
activities need protection from any undue infringement that may occur when
private litigants bring claims against government agencies and instrumentali-
ties."0 On the other hand, as government-owned enterprises increase their
involvement in traditionally private commercial activities, private parties need
available recourse to the judicial process in the event that the government
unduly trammels on their rights and interests in the economic arena.1 An
absolute grant of sovereign immunity to such government entities would give
them "an unfair advantage in their dealings with the private sector. '" 2
These concerns led to the abandonment of the absolute theory of sover-
eign immunity, under which a foreign state was completely immune from
domestic adjudication without its consent, and to the adoption of the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity."3 The restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity accords a foreign state immunity for public or governmental activ-
ity (jure imperii), while rendering the foreign state amenable to domestic
adjudications for its private or commercial activities (jure gestionis).5 4 In
1952 the U.S. Department of State announced its adoption of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity through publication of the Tate Letter, an
official correspondence from the State Department's Acting Legal Adviser,
Jack B. Tate, to the Justice Department's Acting Attorney General, Phillip B.
Perlman." The Tate Letter explained that future U.S. foreign policy concern-
ing the sovereign immunity of foreign nations in domestic courts would
adhere to the principles embodied in the restrictive theory."
49. Hill, supra note 11, at 165.
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (asserting greater likelihood of suits
between foreign governments and private litigants because of increased governmental participa-
tion in commercial transactions).
52. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct of 1976
in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & CoNP. L.Q. 302,303 (1986) (examining policy
considerations underlying formulation and implementation of FSIA).
53. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General deAbastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354,357 (2d Cir. 1964) (analyzing historical development of U.S. sovereign immunity law).
54. Id. at 358.
55. See ChangedPolicy Concerning the Granfing ofSovereignlmmunity toForeign Gov-
ernments, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL., May 1952, at 984-85 (reprinting entire text of State Department
letter announcing change in fundamental State Department policy concerning sovereign im-
munity of foreign nations from domestic adjudication).
56. Id.
AMBASSADORIAL WAIVER
The purpose of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is to attempt
to balance the competing interests of private individuals and parties in having
the courts determine their legal rights, with the interests of independent and
sovereign states in possessing the freedom to perform certain political and
public acts "without undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending
the propriety of such acts before foreign" tribunals. 1 Because the State De-
partment was the executive branch agency responsible for the conduct of
foreign affairs, the courts quite naturally deferred to its policy pronounce-
ments."s To avoid the politically embarrassing consequences that a court's
rejection of a foreign state's claim of sovereign immunity could have on
diplomatic relations, the judiciary normally followed the State Department's
suggestion that a particular foreign state be granted immunity from domestic
litigation. 9 Conversely, when the State Department had either expressly or
implicitly indicated that a foreign state should not be granted immunity, the
courts typically denied the foreign nation immunity from local litigation.'
When the State Department remained silent on the issue of sovereign immu-
nity in a particular case, the courts had a duty to determine, in accordance
with the State Department's general policy, whether the foreign state was
entitled to sovereign immunity from suit.61
However, the application of the restrictive theory "proved troublesome"
in practice.62 The State Department's Tate Letter did not provide the courts
with any guidelines to differentiate between a foreign state's public and private
acts.63 Even though the State Department announced the restrictive theory to
57. See Victory Transp., 336 F2d at 360 (examining applicability of restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity where State Department remains silent on issue of foreign nation's sov-
ereign immunity in particular litigation).
58. See id. at 358 (delineating scope of restrictive theory of sovereign immunity) (citing
Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,360-61 (1955) (holding Republic
of China not immune from U.S. bank's counterclaim seeking affirmative judgment of defaulted
treasury notes when China initiated suit against bank to recover funds Chinese governmental
agency deposited in bank)).
59. See Nat 7 City Bank, 348 U.S. at 360-61 (discussing judiciary's deference to Depart-
ment of State concerning foreign policy matters) (citing Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581
(1943) (deferring to State Department request to grant sovereign immunity to Peruvian govern-
ment vessel in domestic admiralty proceeding)).
60. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General do Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 358 (2d. Cir. 1964) (asserting judiciary's deference to State Department suggestions
of immunity).
61. See Republic ofMexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,34-35 (1945) (expounding guiding
principles to assist court in determining whether foreign state possesses immunity from
domestic litigation).
62. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (analyzing
history of restrictive theory of U.S. sovereign immunity law).
63. See Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 359-60 (discussing conceptual difficulties in applica-
tion of Tate Doctrine).
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be the official U.S. foreign policy position regarding domestic adjudication of
suits involving foreign states, the courts still deferred to the State Department's
suggestions of immunity.' This judicial deference gave foreign nations the
opportunity to manipulate the process by placing diplomatic pressure on the
State Departmenttoobtainimmunityfromsuit. 65 Sometimes "politicalconsid-
erations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not
have been available under the restrictive theory." ' To further exacerbate
inconsistent application of the restrictive theory, courts frequently would rely
on prior State Department decisions to resolve sovereign immunity questions
in cases where the State Department refi-ained from making suggestions ofimmunity.6
Courts soon began to develop their own tests to determine sovereignimmunity under the restrictive theory.' Some courts looked to the nature of
the underlying transaction and categorized as public only those activities that
individuals could not performthemselves. 69 Other courts sought to determine
the purpose ofthe underlying transaction, "categorizing as public all activities
in which the object of performance was public in nature."7" Because any
government activity necessarily serves some type of government purpose, this
test was particularly unhelpful. 71 Additionally, the test often led to arbitrary
results when courts projected onto the litigation their own subjective notions
about the proper sphere of government activity.72 To reduce the uncertainty
and disuniformity that characterized application of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, Congress sought to formally codify' the restrictive theory
in the FSIA.
73
64. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing judiciary's deference to
executive branch determinations of foreign government's sovereign immunity from domestic
adjudication).
65. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 (examining problematic application of restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity before codification of restrictive theory in FSIA).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General do Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) (proposing categorical approach to distinguish between foreign
sovereign's public and private acts).
69. See Cook, supra note 39, at 691-92 (probing shortcomings of sovereign immunity
jurisprudence prior to enactment of FSIA).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 692.
72. Id.
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,1602-11 (1994).
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II Legislative History ofForeign Sovereign Immunities Act
The United States became the first nation to codify its substantive law
of sovereign immunity in statutory form. 4 The codification of U.S. substan-
tive sovereign immunity law in the FSIA was "a great improvement over the
state of the law which existed prior to its enactment."75 The primary purpose
of the FSIA was to establish "the sole and exclusive standards" for determin-
ing whether a foreign sovereign was immune from suit in U.S. federal and
state courts. 76 With the exception of foreign treaties and other valid interna-
tional agreements, the FSIA preempts any other state or federal law.17 The
FSIA also was designed to bring U.S. sovereign immunity doctrine into
conformity with the laws of the general international community as most
other nations had adopted the restrictive theory and had placed sovereign
immunity determinations into the exclusive domain of the judiciary.
7
Congress recognized that in the modem world American citizens have
increased contact with foreign entities engaged in commercial activities. 9
Congress reasoned that firm standards outlining a foreign nation's amen-
ability to suit were necessary because increased contact enhances the poten-
tial for litigation between private parties and foreign sovereigns.8" In estab-
lishing these firm guidelines, Congress outlined several objectives." The
first objective was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity."
This would bring U.S. law into conformity with the laws of the majority of
nations in the international community." These nations routinely applied the
74. See Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts 1976-
1986,19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 19,19 (1986) (discussing congressional enactment ofFSIA);
see also Beresovski, supra note 37, at 90 (same); Feldman, supra note 52, at 303 (same).
75. See Gerard Lacroix, The Theory and Practice of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: Untying the Gordian Knot, 5 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 146, 146 (1987) (suggesting sys-
tematic guide to theoretical and practical intricacies of FSIA); see also supra notes 33-73 and
accompanying text (describing U.S. substantive law of sovereign immunity prior to codification
of restrictive theory in FSIA).
76. See H.R. REP.No. 94-1487,at 12(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604,6610
(providing legislative history and purpose of FSIA).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6604, 6610.
80. See H.tR.REP.No. 94-1487,at7(1976),reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6605-
06 (providing congressional reasoning for development of firm standards to guide judicial
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restrictive theory in their courts in suits against the United States. 4 Addition-
ally, the FSIA would insure the uniform and predictable application of the
restrictive principle in U.S. courts.8" Removal of the determination of a
foreign nation's sovereign immunity from the executive to the judicial branch
reduced the ability of foreign governments to manipulate the decision through
diplomatic channels.8 6 The FSIA therefore eliminates the arbitrariness that
resulted from pre-FSIA court decisions based upon the State Department's
Tate Doctrine.87 The FSIA also augments confidence in the American judi-
cial process because it provides assurance to "litigants that these often crucial
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure
due process." 8
The firm guidelines Congress established through enactment ofthe FSIA
contain clear exceptions to the foreign state's ability to assert sovereign
immunity in U.S. courts.8 9 Especially pertinent for purposes of this Note, the
FSIA establishes that a foreign state may expressly waive its sovereign immu-
nity from suit in U.S. courts."° Congress provided examples of explicit waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity.91 Specifically, the House Report on FSIA states
that a foreign nation may renounce its immunity in a treaty or waive its immu-
nity in a contract with a private party.' Neither of these examples directly
refers to ambassadorial waiver of sovereign immunity.
Because the drafters of the FSIA recognized that modem transactions
and events are often very complex and assume an infinite variety of shapes
and sizes, the drafters were reluctant to codify these transactions and events
into a rigid statutory form.93 The FSIA therefore resembles a constitution
more than a tax code.94 The FSIA allows the law of sovereignty immunity to




87. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of pre-FSIA
application of restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in U.S. courts).
88. JI{L REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6604,6606.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994) (establishing general exceptions to jurisdictional im-
munity of foreign state before domestic courts).
90. See id. § 1605(aXI) (providing for express or implied waiver of sovereign immunity
from suit in domestic adjudication).
91. See HR REP.No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976),reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604,6617
(listing examples of explicit waivers).
92. Id.
93. See Feldman, supra note 52, at 311 (examining policy considerations underlying
formulation and implementation of FSIA).
94. Id.
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laid down by statute."95 This Note thus turns to an examination ofrecent case
law to address the implications of ambassadorial waiver of a foreign state's
sovereign immunity to domestic adjudication in United States courts."
IV Case Law
A. Eleventh Circuit Approach: Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce, N.A.
In Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.,' the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the Ambassador of
Ecuador waived Ecuador's sovereign immunity in a suit concerning the con-
tamination of Ecuadoran shrimp with fungicides and herbicides used on the
banana farms of the state-run "Programa Nacional de Banano," or National
Banana Program (PNB).' Ecuadoran commercial shrimp farmers brought suit
95. Id.
96. See infra Parts IV-V (examining and analyzing case law concerning issue of ambassa-
dorial waiver of foreign state's immunity in domestic adjudications).
97. 179 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999).
98. See Aquamar, SA v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, 179 F.3d 1279, 1299 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that "under the FSIA, courts should assume that an ambassador possesses
the authority to appear before them and waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence
making it 'obvious' that he or she does not"). In Aquamar, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Ecuadoran ambassador to the United States
waived his nation's sovereign immunity in litigation involving the state-run PNB. Id. at 1283-
85. Ecuadoran commercial shrimp farmers brought suit in a Florida state court against the
producers of certain fungicides and herbicides, alleging that the use of these products on
Ecuadoran banana farms had killed their shrimp. Id. at 1282. The defendant producers brought
third-, fourth-, and fiflh-party complaints against PNB, a department within the Republic of
Ecuador's Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, because it employed the allegedly harmful
fungicides and herbicides as part of its banana cultivation operations. Id. The shrimp farmers,
arguing that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction because PNB was immune from suit,
moved to strike the producers' complaints against PNB in an effort to defeat PNB's motion to
dismiss for forum non conveniens. Id. PNB's attorneys responded by filing documents on
behalf of their client purporting to waive PNB's sovereign immunity. Id. at 1283. In addition
to these documents, the Ecuadoran ambassador filed an affidavit in which he stated that he
waived PNB's sovereign immunity on behalf ofPNB and the government ofEcuador. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit held that PNB waived its sovereign immunity from suit under the
FSIA. Id. at 1289. Because PNB qualified as an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of
Ecuador, the court reasoned that PNB should be treated as a foreign state for purposes of the
FSIA. Id. at 1290. The court found the ambassador's affidavit to be a complete and unambig-
uous waiver of the sovereign immunity of both PNB and the Republic of Ecuador. Id. at 1293.
The Eleventh Circuit relied on the congressional policies underlying FSIA and on principles of
international law to conclude that when a duly accredited head of a diplomatic mission, such as
an ambassador, "files a waiver of his or her sovereign's immunity in a judicial proceeding, the
court should assume that the sovereign has authorized the waiver absent extraordinary circum-
stances." Id. at 1294.
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in a Florida state court against the producers of certain fungicides and herbi-
cides, alleging that the use of these products on Ecuadoran banana farms had
killed their shrimp.' The defendant producers brought third-, fourth-, and
fifth-party complaints against the PNB, a department within the Republic of
Ecuador's Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, because it employed the
allegedly harmful fungicides and herbicides as part of its banana cultivation
operations." °
Pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), PNB removed the cases to federal dis-
trict court, where it joined in the fungicide and pesticide producers' motion
to dismiss the complaints of the shrimp farmers on the grounds of forum non
conveniens.11 The plaintiff shrimp farmers moved to strike the defendant
producers third-, fourth-, and fifth-party complaints against PNB in an effort
to defeat the motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.' ° The plaintiffs
argued, inter alia, that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction over PNB
"because PNB had sovereign immunity from suit under the FSIA."' °3 The
PNB's attorneys responded by filing documents on behalf of their client pur-
porting to waive PNB's sovereign immunity.104 Additionally, Edgar Teran,
Ecuador's Ambassador to the United States, filed an affidavit in which he
stated that he waived PNB's sovereign immunity on behalf of PNB and the
government of Ecuador "[w]ithout waiving any other defense of law or fact
to the claims asserted against" PNB in the pending litigation.105 The ambassa-
dor further stated that PNB's immunity was waived "for the purposes of these




The plaintiff shrimp farmers countered that Ecuadoran law authorized
only Ecuador's attorney generalto act injudicial matters, that the constitution
of Ecuador "did not allow anyone to waive Ecuador's sovereign immunity,"
and that the Ambassador of Ecuador acted under the influence of improper
motives when he purported to waive PNB's sovereign immunity."° The fed-
eral trial court found that PNB had not waived its sovereign immunity be-
cause the Ecuadoran ambassador's affidavit purporting to waive immunity on
behalf of PNB was explicitly limited to the litigation of the forum non





104. Id. at 1283.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1284.
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conveniens motion to dismiss pending before the court."° The trial court sub-
sequently granted defendants' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
dismissed the complaints against the PNB, and remanded the remaining cases
to the Florida state court on the grounds that "without PNB as a party, it no
longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.""' 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held "that PNB waived its
sovereign immunity and therefore is not immune from suit under the FSIA."" °
The court ruled that PNB was to be treated as a foreign state for purposes of
the FSIA because it was an agency ofthe Republic of Ecuador.' The court
further ruled that the attempts of PNB's attorneys to waive immunity did not
constitute a waiver because they failed to qualify under the test of "a 'clear,
complete, unambiguous, and unmistakable' manifestation of the sovereign's
intent to waive its immunity."' 2 However, the court found that the ambassa-
dor's affidavit waived PNB's immunity completely and unambiguously
because the "word 'only,' in the phrase 'for the purposes of these litigations
only and in connection with the pending forum non conveniens motions,'




The court relied upon the congressional policies underlying FSIA and
principles of international law to conclude that when a duly accredited head
of a diplomatic mission, such as an ambassador, "files a waiver of his or her
sovereign's immunity in a judicial proceeding, the court should assume that
the sovereign has authorized the waiver absent extraordinary circum-
stances.""' 4 The Eleventh Circuit found that Ecuador's ambassador had in
fact waived his nation's sovereign immunity as it pertained to the state-run
PNB." s Specifically, the court held that "under the FSIA, courts should
assume that an ambassador possesses the authority to appear before them and
waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence making it 'obvious'
that he or she does not." 16
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id at 1289.
111. Id. at 1290.
112. Id. at 1292 (quoting Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)).
113. SeeAquamar, 179 F.3d at 1293 (analyzing ambassadorial affidavit).
114. Id. at 1294.
115. See id. at 1289 (holding that PNB is immune from suit under FSIA because Ecuador's
ambassador waived PNB's sovereign immunity).
116. Id. at 1299.
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1. Underlying Policy in Aquamar
In reaching its conclusion in Aquamar, the court relied in part on the
policy considerations of the United States Congress underlying the FSIA."7
Congress soughtto create uniform and predictable standards applicableto suits
concerning foreign governments andtheir agencies."' Suchuniform standards
seek to eliminate the need for the non-judicial branches of government to
become mired in case-by-case diplomatic determinations and inquiries into
waivers of immunity. 9 They also help ensure procedural and substantive due
process to the litigants of a suit involving a foreign sovereign as an actual or
potential party to the proceedings. 2 For example, the FSIA provides foreign
governments with notice of when they may become amenable to suit within the
United States. 21 Foreign governments may exercise an option to elect to
litigate in U.S. courts by expressly or implicitly waiving sovereign immunity
under FSIA § 1605(a)(1).'" The FSIA also provides those who conduct
business with foreign governments with a predictable and uniform method to
determine jurisdiction when a dispute arises betweenthem.2' Requiring courts
to inquire into the local law of the foreign state in making a determination
whether a foreign ambassador possesses the authority of his or her nation to
waive sovereign immunity in domestic U.S. adjudications would frustrate the
goals and purposes of the FSIA. 24 Lengthy, unpredictable, and inconclusive
examinations into conflicting interpretations of the foreign sovereign's diplo-
matic law would at best create significant impediments to all FSIA actions." s
In the worst case scenario, the litigants and foreign sovereigns involved
in litigation could manipulate and abuse such a requirement.126 The foreign
sovereign negatively affected by the outcome of such litigation may attempt
to invoke sovereign immunity "'even after it has unsuccessfully defended [its
position] on the merits.'""27 The foreign sovereign would thus have an unfair
117. See id. at 1297 (finding additional support in congressional intent underlying FSIA
for court's holding that courts should presume ambassador's authority to waive sovereign
immunity absent compelling contrary evidence).
118. Id. at 1297-98.
119. See id. at 1298 (discussing reasons supporting congressional intent to create uniform
and predictable standards applicable to suits concerning foreign governments and their agencies).
120. Id.
121. See id. (noting benefits to foreign governments derived from provisions of FSIA).





127. Id. (quoting George Kahale I, State Loan Transactions: Foreign Law Restrictions
on WaiversoflmmunityandSubmissionstoJurisdicion,37Bus.LAw. 1549,1561 n.70 (1982)).
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advantage over the other parties to the proceedings through exploitation of
the foreign sovereign's ability to "'reap the benefits of our courts while avoid-
ing the obligations of international law.""'12
Other parties to the litigation, in addition to the foreign sovereign, may
also attempt to manipulate the process under a rule requiring the court to
inquire into the foreign sovereign's domestic law to resolve immunity issues
involving ambassadorial waivers." Under the FSIA, a foreign sovereign
desiring to participate in a domestic U.S. adjudication may explicitly or
implicitly waive its immunity.13 However, if courts regularly inquired into
the authority of an ambassador to effect such a waiver, apartyto the litigation
opposed to the presence of the foreign sovereign might oppose the foreign
sovereign's waiver of its own immunity on the grounds that the foreign sover-
eign's domestic laws prevent the ambassador from doing so.'
There are additional concerns related to the judiciary's "role in the
sensitive area of international relations [which] mitigate against questioning
an ambassador's representations... before [domestic] courts."'32 A rule
mandating judicial investigation of an ambassador's authority to waive im-
munity would potentially increase the frequency of "intrusive and resented
inquiries of foreign governments."'33 A court's investigation into a foreign
ambassador's authorization to engage in traditional diplomatic duties can
impede upon the purview ofthe U.S. executive and legislative branches inthe
realm of U.S. foreign relations.' Whether a foreign ambassador has author-
ity to represent and act on behalf of his nation is a matter for the political
branches of government to determine.' The judiciary should defer to the
executive and legislative branches to provide the answer to such political




131. See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1298 (arguing against proposed requirement of judicial
investigation into domestic law of foreign ambassador to determine whether ambassador has
authority under his or her sovereign's law to waive immunity in domestic U.S. adjudication).
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting First Fid. Bank, N.A. v. Gov't ofAntigua & Barbuda - Permanent Mis-
sion, 877 F.2d 189,199 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
134. See id. (noting potential negative impact of inquiry into domestic law of foreign am-
bassador to determine whether ambassador has authority under his or her sovereign's law to
waive immunity in domestic U.S. adjudication).
135. See id. (noting that judicial inquiry into foreign ambassador's domestic law to deter-
mine if such ambassador has authority to waive his or her nation's sovereign immunity intrudes
upon foreign relations sphere of powers belonging to executive and legislative branches) (citing
Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. Am. Can Co., 258 F. 363, 368-69 (2d Cir. 1919)
(holding certificate of Russian ambassador as authoritative representation by Russian govern-
ment and binding and conclusive in courts of U.S. against Russian government)).
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questions.136 Finally, judicial investigation into foreign ambassadorial authori-
zation to waive sovereign immunity may implicate the act of state doctrine.
137
The act of state doctrine limits the ability of U.S. courts to inquire "'into the
validity of a recognized foreign sovereign's public acts committed within its
own territory. "1
38
The Aquamar court was careful to emphasize that courts should not
automatically "deem an ambassador to be authorized to waive a sovereign's
immunity under all circumstances.'13 9 A court may face a situation in which
"an ambassador may so clearly lack authority that his or her representations
to a court do not bind the sovereign."' 40 For example, an ambassador's state-
ments may not bind the nation the ambassador represents when the ambas-
sador's statements plainly contradict the official position of that nation. 4'
Therefore, to reiterate the Aquamar court's holding, under the FSIA, "courts
should assume that an ambassador possesses the authority to appear before
them and waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence making it
'obvious' that he or she does not."'1 42
2. Aquamar Court Looks to International Law
In addition to the congressional policy considerations underlying the
FSIA, the Aquamar court examined a variety of sources to ascertain princi-
ples of international law, including international conventions, customs,
treaties, and judicial decisions rendered in this and other countries.'43 The
court employed these principles of international law to facilitate its under-
standing of the FSIA and its applications. 44 The Aquamar court recognized
that prior to passage of the FSIA, the United States Department of State
usually made the determination of whether a foreign sovereign possessed
immunity from suit in domestic U.S. litigation. 45 The State Department gen-
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1299 (noting judicial inquiry into domestic law of foreign ambassador to
determine ambassadorial authorization to waive sovereign immunity may implicate act of state
doctrine).
138. Id. (quoting Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov't of Hond., 129 F.3d 543, 550 (1 th
Cir. 1997) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,401 (1964))).
139. See id. (emphasizing that presumption of foreign ambassador's authority to waive his




143. See id. at 1294-95 (reasoning that courts may look to international law as guide to
understanding meaning of FSIA's provisions).
144. See id. at 1294-97 (employing principles of international law to facilitate understand-
ing of FSIA provisions).
145. See id. at 1294 (recognizing U.S. State Department's role in determination of whether
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erally relied upon traditional international law principles in formulating its
policies on sovereign immunity.146 Therefore, enactment of the FSIA did not
eliminate the relevance of international law to sovereign immunity inquiries
in domestic adjudications. 147 Instead, the FSIA codified pre-existing interna-
tional and federal common law when it transferred the determination of sov-
ereign immunity from the purview of the executive branch to the less politi-
cized realm of the judiciary.1
4 1
The fundamental principles of international law indicate "that a sover-
eign's chief diplomatic representative to a foreign nation possesses an extraor-
dinary role and powers."1 '49 The important role of the ambassador as a diplo-
matic agenthas been recognizedthroughouthistory. 5 ° Primary ambassadorial
functions include representation of the sending sovereign in the receiving
nation, protection of the interests of the sovereign state and its nationals
abroad, and representation of the sovereign state in international organiza-
tions.' Ambassadors also possess expansive authority to make decisions that
bind the nations they represent. 52 In fact some nations, such as the United
Kingdom and Australia, "have codified a rule that a diplomatic representative
always has authority to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of his or her
sovereign."' International tribunals traditionally have presumed that the
powers of an ambassador or diplomatic representative include the authority to
represent officially his or her nation's positions and interests before foreign
judiciaries."s For example, if a foreign ambassador signs "an application to
initiate proceedings before the International Court of Justice" on behalf of the
nation the foreign ambassador represents, the court will accept the ambassa-
dor's signature without authentication. 55 Moreover, the United Nations Inter-
foreign nation possessed immunity from suit in U.S. courts previous to enactment of PSIA)
(citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,486-87 (1983)).
146. See id. (noting that U.S. State Department policy on sovereign immunity generally
reflected customary international law).
147. See id. (analyzing relevancy of international law to sovereign immunity inquiries after
passage of FSIA).
148. Id. (citing Stephens v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1234 (2d Cir.
1995)).
149. Id. at 1295.
150. See id. at 1295-96 (acknowledging that "from ancient times" peoples of all nations
have recognized status of diplomatic agents) (quoting Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, Apr. 18,1961, pmbl., 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95).
151. See id. (noting broad powers of ambassador traditionally recognized under funda-
mental principles of international law).
152. Id. at 1296.
153. Id.
154. See id. (discussing traditional role and authority of ambassador in context of funda-
mental principles of international law).
155. See id. (providing specific examples of foreign ambassador's traditional roles and au-
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national Law Commission has stated that courts should presume that a for-
eign ambassador has the represented nation's authority to waive the diplo-
matic immunity of the foreign nation's agents and representatives.156
The Aquamar court further recognized that the jurisprudence of many
U.S. jurisdictions reflects the presumption of international law that a foreign
ambassador possesses the authority to represent the foreign ambassador's
nation in domestic legal proceedings. Such presumed ambassadorial
authority includes both the power to assert and the power to waive the sover-
eign immunity of the nation-state the ambassador represents."5 The long-
established presumption of ambassadorial authority to assert or waive sover-
eign immunity originates from the practical needs of the U.S., foreign, and
international court systems."5 9 A foreign nation's embassy, located in the
forum state, is typically much more accessible to litigants and domestic courts
than are members of the foreign nation's home government. 6° This more
immediate availability of a foreign sovereign's ambassador in a domestic
forum increases the convenience of litigants to domestic adjudication involv-
ing the foreign sovereign or interests which the foreign sovereign seeks to
protect.' TheAquamar court speculated that "[p]erhaps for this reason, the
transmission of a state's decision whether to invoke or claim immunity is one
of the traditional functions of an embassy" and its ambassador. 62
B. Second Circuit Approach
1. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda -
Permanent Mission
In First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda -
Permanent Mission, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit employed
New York agency law principles to determine whether a foreign ambassador
thority) (citing I.C.J Rules of Court, art. 38 ("If the application bears the signature of someone
other than [the] diplomatic representative [to the forum country], the signature must be authen-
ticated by the latter or by the competent authority of the applicant's foreign ministry.")).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1297 (citing Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396,400 (2d
Cir. 1927)).
158. See id. (acknowledging U.S. presumption of foreign ambassadorial authorization both
to assert and to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of nation foreign ambassador represents).
159. See id. (recognizing practical importance of presumption of foreign ambassadorial





163. 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
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possessed apparent authority to borrow money and to enter a consent order
which purported to obligate the government of Antigua to repay borrowed
funds and to waive Antigua's sovereign immunity.' Ambassador Lloydstone
Jacobs, Antigua's ambassadortothe UnitedNations, borrowed $250,000 from
the First National State Bank of New Jersey, the predecessor to First Fidelity
Bank, N.A.165 Ambassador Jacobs signed for the loan in his official capacity
as the Ambassador of Antigua, representing the "Government of Antigua &
Barbuda- Permanent Mission."1 The given purpose of the loan was 'to pay
for the renovation of Antigua's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in
New York.0 67 In reality, the borrowed funds were invested in an Antiguan
casino." After payments on the loan ceased and efforts to reach a settlement
to repay the financial obligation failed, First Fidelity sought and obtained a
default judgment against the government of Antigua.169 When First Fidelity
instituted efforts to levy upon Antigua's bank accounts, Ambassador Jacobs
formally acknowledged the debt and sought a settlement.!" First Fidelity and
164. See First Fid. Bank, NA v. Gov't ofAntigua & Barbuda - Permanent Mission, 877
F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1989) (employing agency law principles to determine whether Antigua's
ambassador possessed apparent authority to borrow money and to enter consent order which
waived Antigua's sovereign immunity and obligated government of Antigua to repay borrowed
funds). In FirstFidelity, the Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit considered whether Antig-
ua's ambassador to the United Nations, Lloydstone Jacobs, possessed the authority to bind the
government ofAntigua to a consent order waiving Antigua's sovereign immunity from suit and
obligating the government to repay borrowed funds. Id. at 190-91. Ambassador Jacobs, pur-
porting to act in his official ambassadorial capacity, procured a loan for $250,000 from First
Fidelity, a U.S. bank, for the stated purpose of financing renovations to Antigua's mission to
the United Nations. Id. at 191. Instead of using the loan proceeds to renovate the mission,
Antiguan officials diverted the funds to invest in an Antiguan casino. Id. Ambassador Jacobs
agreed to the consent order waiving Antigua's sovereign immunity as part of an effort to relieve
Antigua's outstanding financial obligations to First Fidelity Bank. Id.
The Second Circuit applied traditional agency law principles to determine whether Am-
bassador Jacobs "possessed the apparent authority to borrow the money and to waive Antigua's
sovereign immunity." Id. at 193. The court reasoned that the Ambassador's inherent authority
should not be dispositive of the validity of his actions. Id. at 192. The court noted that the
circumstances surrounding an ambassador's signature to a treaty may be grounds for inval-
idating the treaty. Id. at 192-93. For example, such a signature would be invalid ifit was the
result of either coercion or corruption. Id. at 192. The Second Circuit directed the trial court,
on remand, to make a factual inquiry into the government of Antigua's manifestations to First
Fidelity to determine Ambassador Jacob's apparent authority to enter the consent order and to
waive Antigua's sovereign immunity. Id. at 193.
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Ambassador Jacobs eventually "agreed to a settlement and signed a consent
order.""' This consent order "included a complete waiver of Antigua's sover-
eign immunity from jurisdiction, attachment, and execution.""' The consent
order was "signed on behalf of the Government of Antigua and Barbuda by
Lloydstone Jacobs, 'Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,' and by
Robert Healey as the Government's attorney.""
73
After payments again ceased, First Fidelity sought to attach bank ac-
counts that Antigua's U.S. embassy maintained in Washington, D.C.' The
government of Antigua responded with a motion to dismiss the bank's com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to vacate
the consent order on grounds that it was invalid because Ambassador Jacobs
had acted without Antigua's authority in borrowing money and in consenting
to the settlement."' Antigua therefore argued that it had not waived its
sovereign immunity to the action instituted by First Fidelity to recover the
debt. 7 The trial court denied Antigua's motion, applying the domestic
agency law of New York to hold that the government of Antigua was respon-
sible for the actions of Ambassador Jacobs.' 77 Because the loan transaction
fell within the commercial activity exception ofthe FSIA, the trial court ruled
that Antigua could not claim sovereign immunity.17'
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court,
concluding "that the default judgment should have been set aside."'79 The
court found the real issue to be whether Ambassador Jacobs, in the role of
Antigua's official representative to the United Nations, possessed the requi-
site apparent authority to borrow the money, to agree to the consent order,
and thus to waive Antigua's sovereign immunitys ° The court recognized
that "an ambassador to the U.N. possesses the same privileges and immunities










180. See id. at 193 (applying traditional agency law principles to determine central issue
of case to be whether ambassador possessed apparent authority to act on behalf of Antiguan
government).
181. See id. at 192 (recognizing authority possessed by foreign ambassador to United
Nations as equivalent to privileges and immunities of United States envoys (citing Agreement
Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of
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dor's representations typically are authorized by the sovereign the ambassa-
dor represents, a sovereign "can be bound by the representative's unautho-
rized actions where the lack of authority is not obvious.' 1 82 However, the
court reasoned that the powers inherent in an ambassador's position are not
dispositive in determining whether an ambassador possesses the requisite
authorization to waive the sovereign immunity of the nation the ambassador
represents.'83 The "possession of authority does not, ipso facto, validate
every exercise of it."'
184
The court analyzed the context surrounding Ambassador Jacobs's sig-
nature to the consent decree and its accompanying waiver of Antigua's sov-
ereign immunity, distinguishing Ambassador Jacobs's pure commercial
transactions with First Fidelity from more traditional international agreements
which "have considerably more dignity."' The Second Circuit reasoned that
the mere signature of an ambassador does not automatically make an inter-
national agreement binding upon the nation the ambassador represents. 86 An
example of a situation in which international agreements do not bind the
foreign sovereign occurs when the ambassador signs the document signifying
the agreement as the direct result of third party coercion or corrupt motives
possessed by the foreign ambassador."s The court concluded that if the
surrounding circumstances of an ambassador's signature to a treaty may
be grounds for invalidation of that treaty, "then surely a state cannot auto-
matically be bound by its ambassador's settlement of a lawsuit by a non-
sovereign third party arising from a commercial transaction."' 8 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the trial court, on remand, to
conduct a factual inquiry into whether the government of Antigua made
manifestations to First Fidelity Bank that Ambassador Jacobs possessed
Antigua's authorization to enter into the commercial transaction with the
the United Nations, June 26, 1947, art. V, §15, 61 Stat 3416, 3427-28, T.IA S. No. 1676, at
13-15, authorized by SJ. Res. of Aug. 4,1947, Pub. L. No. 80-357,61 Stat. 756, set out in 22
U.S.C. § 287 note (1982))).
182. Id. (citing RESTATElMENT(THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONS § 311 reporter's n.4 (1987)).
183. See First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 192 (noting that powers inherent in ambassador's posi-
tion are not dispositive in and of themselves of whether ambassador possesses requisite author-
ity to waive his or her nation's sovereign immunity).
184. Id.
185. See id, (noting distinction between commercial transactions and traditional interna-
tional agreements).
186. Id.
187. See id. (providing examples of events that render ambassador signature to interna-
tional agreement invalid (citing RESTATEMMT (TBMi) OF FORMGN RELATIONS §§ 331(lXc),
331(2Xa) (1987))).
188. Id. at 192-93.
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bank and to represent officially the government of Antigua in the lawsuit
initiated by First Fidelity Bank." 9
Judge Newman dissented on grounds that the majority's decision fash-
ions a rule of law that risks impairment of international relations between the
United States and those foreign nations that send their duly accredited ambas-
sadors to head diplomatic missions within the United States."9 Application
of the forum state's agency law may negatively affect the uniformity of laws
which is so essential to the smooth operational flow of foreign relations in the
international arena. 9' Relationships with foreign governments are jeopar-
dized as vendors may become "unwilling to extend credit for goods and
services ordered by embassies and impelling others to make potentially in-
trusive and resented inquiries of foreign governments."'"
In Aquamar, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit distinguished
its ruling fromthe Second Circuit's decision inFirstFidety. 193 TheAquamar
court recognized that it did not engage in a 'traditional apparent authority
inquiry because a finding of apparent authority requires reliance."'94 Such
reliance rarely occurs when the "court first considers an explicit waiver made
in the course ofjudicial proceedings," as the Eleventh Circuit did in its Aqua-
mar decision. 95 Even though the Second Circuit in First Fidelity "analyzed
the waiver under state agency law, ratherthan the federal and international law
principles" that the Eleventh Circuit examined in Aquamar, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reasoned that the rule arrived at in First Fidelity paralleled its own ruling
inAquamar.'6 Both cases ruled that domestic courts should accept a foreign
ambassador's authority to waive the sovereign immunity of the represented
nation absent "obvious" evidence that the ambassador lacks such authority.Y
189. See id. at 193-94, 196 (remanding case for factual inquiry into whether Ambassador
Jacobs possessed apparent authority to represent Antiguan government in transaction and law-
suit).
190. See id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority court's ruling may have
deleterious impact upon United States foreign relations).
191. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that inquiries into local agency law to deter-
mine ambassadorial authorization to waive or assert sovereign immunity on behalf of nation
ambassador represents will hamper much desired uniformity of laws and will possibly detract
from normalized diplomatic relations).
192. Id. at 199 (Newman, J., dissenting).
193. See Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA., 179 F.3d 1279, 1299 (11th
Cir. 1999) (stating that nature of ambassador's activities distinguishes cases).
194. Id. at 1299 n.42 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 8 cmt d (1958)).
195. Id.
196. See id. (acknowledging parallel betweenAquamar and First Fidelity rulings).
197. Id. (citing First Fid. Bank v. Gov't ofAntigua & Barbuda - Permanent Mission, 877
F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1989).
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2. Jota v. Texaco, Inc.
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adjudi-
cated a matter involving the Republic of Ecuador and Ambassador Teran, the
very same nation and ambassador at the heart of the dispute inAquamar.1' In
Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,'" indigenous residents of Ecuador's Oriente region and
nearby Peruvian communities brought suit against Texaco in the Southem
District of New York alleging that Texaco's oil extraction techniques polluted
the rainforests and rivers of Oriente and caused physical harm to the region's
inhabitants.2 'o The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco polluted the rainforests and
198. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (concerning consoli-
dated class actions brought by residents of Ecuador's Oriente region and nearby Peruvian com-
munities alleging that Texaco subsidiary polluted nearby rain forests and rivers causing resi-
dents and their families to experience various physical maladies).
199. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
200. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155-56, 158 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that
Ecuadoran ambassador possessed apparent authority to assert Ecuador's sovereign immunity
from suit in U.S. domestic adjudication). In Jota, members of indigenous tribes residing in the
Oriente region of Ecuador and Peruvian residents living downstream from the Oriente region
brought suit against Texaco in the Southern District of New York alleging that Texaco's oil
extraction techniques polluted the rainforests and rivers of Oriente and caused physical harm
to the region's inhabitants. Id. at 155. The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco's improper oil extrac-
tion and petroleum waste disposal techniques caused environmental harm to the Oriente region
for a period of nearly thirty years, from 1964 to 1992. Id. Texaco countered with a motion to
dismiss the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens, comity, and failure to join the
Republic of Ecuador as an indispensable party. Id. at 156. PetroEcuador, Ecuador's state-
owned oil agency, acquired a 25% share of ownership in the consortium in 1974 and became
the sole owner of the consortium by 1992. Id. Ecuador's ambassador to the United States
formally objected to U.S. jurisdiction of the suit, asserting that the trial was an affront to the
national sovereignty of Ecuador and interfered with Ecuador's "paramount interests" in the
formulation of its own environmental and industrial policies. Id. Plaintiffs responded with
various documents signed by members of the Ecuadoran legislature indicating their support for
U.S. jurisdiction over the suit against Texaco. Id. at 157. In spite of the support of several
prominent members of the Ecuadoran National Congress for U.S. adjudication of the plaintiffs'
claims, the trial court granted Texaco's motion to dismiss on all three grounds. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the orders of the trial
court dismissing the complaint, the Ecuadoran plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and the
Republic of Ecuador's motion to intervene and remanded the case for further consideration. Id.
at 155. The Second Circuit noted that the district court should have dismissed only those
equitable claims which required Ecuador's participation in order to grant relief. Id. at 161. The
court found the district court's denial of Ecuador's motion to intervene to be justified. Id. at
163. The court reasoned that even though the Ecuadoran Attorney General and members of the
Ecuadoran legislature sought intervention in the suit, "the official position of the Ecuadoran
Ambassador to the United States remained opposed to the litigation and especially to Ecuador's
role in it." Id. at 162. The court recognized that in general, an ambassador may exercise his
authority to "'bind the state that he represents.'" Id. (quoting First Fid. Bank, N.A. v. Gov't of
Antigua & Barbuda - Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining tradi-
tional ambassadorial authority)). The court further reasoned that even if Ecuador's ambassador
did not possess actual authority to assert Ecuador's sovereign immunity, the ambassador "en-
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rivers of the Oriente region for a period of nearly thirty years, from 1964 to
1992.201 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that Texaco's improper disposal
of toxic oil extraction by-products and oil leakages from the Texaco-con-
structed Trans-Ecuadoran Pipeline polluted the local environment and caused
its residents to suffer various physical maladies, including poisoning and
precancerous growths."' Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that Texaco
dumped large amounts of toxic petroleum by-products from the oil extraction
process into local rivers, instead of pumping the toxins back into the emptied
wells in accordance with the prevailing industry standards and practices. 3
The plaintiffs also alleged that Texaco engaged in other improper techniques
to eliminate the toxic petroleum by-products, "such as burning them, dumping
them directly into landfills, and spreading them on the local dirt roads."2 °8 The
plaintiffs sought money damages to remedy the various physical injuries
Texaco's environmental pollution allegedly caused.0' In addition to money
damages, the plaintiffs sought widespread "equitable relief to remedy the
contamination and spoilation of their properties, water supplies and environ-
ment.120 6 Texaco countered with a motion to dismiss the complaint on
grounds of forum non conveniens, comity, and failure to join the Republic of
Ecuador as an indispensable party.2'
Texaco's subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum Company (TexPet), began drilling
for oil in Ecuador's Oriente region in 1965.208 Once oil was discovered in
1969, TexPet began extracting the petroleum through a consortium jointly
owned with Gulf Oil.209 PetroEcuador, the state-owned oil agency of the
Ecuadoran government, began acquiring an ownership interest in the con-
sortium in 1974, becoming the sole owner of the consortium by 1992.21 Edgar
joyed apparent authority, and Texaco and the District Court were entitled to rely on his repre-
sentations unless they were actually aware that he lacked such authority." Id. at 163 (citing
FirstFidelity, 877 F.2d at 193 n.2, 194 (employing agency law principles to determine whether
Antigua's ambassador possessed apparent authority to borrow money and to agree to consent
order that waived Antigua's sovereign immunity and obligated government ofAntigua to repay
borrowed funds)). Finally, the Second Circuit noted that the district court on remand may "re-
consider the issue before it in light of Ecuador's changed litigating position." Id. at 155.
201. Id. at 155.
202. Id. at 155-56.
203. Id. at 155.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 156.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. (providing brief history of Texaco Petroleum Company's involvement in oil





Teran, Ecuador's ambassador to the United States, sent a letter to the U.S.
Department of State explicitly asserting Ecuador's sovereign immunity from
suit in these proceedings.2 ' Specifically, Ambassador Teran claimed that the
pendant litigation was "an affrontto Ecuador's national sovereignty."212 Am-
bassador Teran indicated that U.S. adjudication of the Oriente residents' suit
against Texaco would impede Ecuador's "paramount interest in formulating
its own environmental and industrial policies. "
213
Additionally, counsel representing the Republic of Ecuador filed an
amicus brief supporting Texaco's motion to dismiss the complaint of the
Oriente residents.214 The amicus brief informed the trial court of Ecuador's
objection to U.S. jurisdiction over the Oriente oil pollution dispute and was
accompanied by an affidavit signed by Ambassador Teran reiterating Ecua-
dor's sovereign immunity in this matter.215 The Ecuadoran ambassador also
indicated that the courts in Ecuador were available to adjudicate the disputes
in question." 6 Texaco submitted a copy of Ambassador Teran's letter to the
court.
21 7
Members of Ecuador's legislature apparently disagreed with their na-
tion's assertion of sovereign immunity.218 Plaintiffs filed three documents
signed by representatives of the Ecuadoran National Congress supporting the
Oriente residents' complaint against Texaco.219 The first document was a copy
of a letter in which the President ofthe Ecuadoran National Congress and four
committee presidents "wrote to Ecuador's President and Foreign Minister ex-
pressingtheir 'concern' overthepositionthatAmbassadorTeranhadtaken."' 0
In particular, the President of the Congress and four committee leaders dis-
approved of the Ecuadoran administration's bias in favor of the interests of
Texaco." The second document was an "official announcement" from Ecua-
dor's President of the Special Permanent Commission on Environmental
211. See id. (discussing Texaco's effort to bolster its motion to dismiss through submission
to court of Ambassador Teran's letter asserting Ecuador's sovereign immunity from suit).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 157 (discussing Ecuador's amicus brief filed in support of Texaco's motion
to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 156.
217. Id.




221. Id. (quoting letter from high-ranking members of Ecuadoran Congress to Ecuadoran
President and Foreign Minister).
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Defense. 2  The announcement proclaimed the commission's position that
U.S. adjudication of the Oriente plaintiffs' dispute with Texaco was essential
in order to ensure a just resolution of the plight of the Oriente plaintiffs.?
The final document contained a resolution ofthe Special Permanent Commis-
sion on Environmental Defense, stamped with the official seal of the "Gen-
eral Secretaryship ofthe National Congress," supporting the Oriente plaintiffs
in their litigation in the U.S. forum. 4
In addition to evidence indicative of Ecuadoran congressional intent,
there was evidence suggesting that the Ecuadoran executive branch changed
its position on Ecuador's sovereign immunity from suit in the Oriente adjudi-
cation as well.2" In an affidavit accompanying Ecuador's motion to intervene
after the trial court dismissed the Oriente plaintiffs' complaint, the Attorney
General of Ecuador stated that Ecuador sought to intervene in order "to
protect the interests of the indigenous citizens of the Ecuadorian Amazon
who where seriously affected by the environmental contamination attributed
to [Texaco]. " "6 The apparent change in Ecuador's position on its sovereign
immunity to the Oriente adjudication was reflective of the different policies
of Ecuador's newly elected administration.227
Notwithstanding the purported intent ofimembers of Ecuador's legislative
and executive branches to waive Ecuador's sovereign immunity from suit, the
trial court granted Texaco's motion to dismiss on all three grounds.' In
particular, the trial court noted that plaintiffs' failure tojoin PetroEcuador and
the Republic of Ecuador as indispensable parties constituted an "inde-
pendently-sufficient reason" for dismissal. 9 The Ecuadoran plainfiffs subse-
quently filed a motion to reconsider on grounds that the newly elected admin-
istration of Ecuador was willing to waive sovereign immunity and intervene
in the suit.23 ° Counsel for Ecuador filed a motion to intervene accompanied
with an affidavit from Ecuador's Attorney General stating his nation's "offi-
cialjudicial position."'" The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' motion to recon-
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting announcement of Special Permanent Commission on Environmental
Defense proclaiming its position on proper forum of Oriente litigation).
224. Id.
225. See id. at 158 (discussing Republic of Ecuador's motion to intervene).
226. See id. (describing changed position of Ecuadoran government regarding Ecuador's
sovereign immunity in Oriente litigation).
227. See id. (noting plaintiffs' contention that Ecuador was now willing to waive sovereign
immunity due to election of new administration).
228. Id. at 157.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 158.
231. Id.
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sider. 2 The court also denied Ecuador's motion to intervene on grounds of
untimeliness.3 Furthermore, because Ecuador was unwilling to be amenable
to any potential counterclaims and cross-claims from Texaco and the Peruvian
plaintiffs, the trial court found that the Republic of Ecuador had not expressly
and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the
orders of the trial court, dismissing the Peruvian and Ecuadoran plainfiffs'
complaint and the Ecuadoran plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. 5 The
court also denied the Republic of Ecuador's motion to intervene and re-
manded the case for further consideration. 6 The court held that the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint on grounds offorum non conveniens
and comity "was erroneous in the absence of a condition requiring Texaco to
submit to jurisdiction in Ecuador." 7 The court reasoned that dismissal on
such grounds is warranted only where an alternate forum is available. 8
Without Texaco's submission to jurisdiction in Ecuador, an alternate forum
would not exist.239 The court further held that the trial court erred when it
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for failure to join Ecuador as an indispensable
party.240 The trial court reasoned that "it would be impossible to achieve the
extensive equitable relief sought by the plaintiffs" in light of Ecuador's
absence as a party to the litigation.241 The Second Circuit held that the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint was erroneous because only those claims
which required Ecuador's participation should have been dismissed.242
The Second Circuit commented upon the unusual nature of this case,
noting that the Republic of Ecuador "initially expressed vigorous opposition
to the maintenance of this litigation in a United States Court and now, after
a change in government, just as vigorously urges that the litigation proceed
here."243 In spite of evidence indicating that the Ecuadoran legislature and the
newly elected administration favored at least a partial waiver of Ecuador's




235. Id. at 155.
236. Id. at 162-63.
237. Id. at 155.
238. Id. at 158-60.
239. Id. at 159.
240. Id. at 155.
241. Id. at 157.
242. Id. at 161.
243. Id. at 155.
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 645 (2001)
asserted position on waiver of sovereign immunity justified the earlier denial
of intervention."" In support of this proposition, the court noted that ambas-
sadors traditionally possess the authority to represent their nation's interests
and official positions before foreign judiciaries.24 Even though members of
the Ecuadoran National Congress and the Attorney General of Ecuador
expressed their support for a waiver of Ecuador's immunity, '"he official
position of the Ecuadoran Ambassador to the United States remained opposed
to the litigation and especially to Ecuador's role in it."246 Counsel for the
Republic of Ecuador maintained that, under the constitution of Ecuador, the
attorney general is "the only judicial representative of the State."247 The
Second Circuit interpreted this provision of Ecuador's constitution to apply
only to domestic legal matters within the borders of Ecuador.24 Finally, the
court reasoned that, even if Ambassador Teran was not authorized to assert
or waive Ecuador's sovereign immunity, he "enjoyed apparent authority, and
Texaco and the District Court were entitled to rely on his representations
unless they were actually aware that he lacked such authority."249
The court concluded its opinion by noting that on remand the trial court
may "reconsider the issue before it in light of Ecuador's changed litigating
position.""' The Republic of Ecuador should be allowed the opportunity to
revise its position if it so chooses, even '"hough Ecuador's previously as-
serted position on waiver of sovereign immunity justified the earlier denial
of intervention."2
1
3. Heaney v. Government of Spain
Inapre-FSIA decision, the Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit recog-
nized the authority of a foreign ambassador to assert the sovereign's immunity
244. See id. at 163 (finding that trial court was justified in its decision to deny Ecuador's
motion to intervene on basis of Ecuadoran ambassador's previously asserted position declaring
Ecuador's sovereign immunity from suit).
245. See id. at 162-63 (noting traditional authority of ambassador to represent ambassa-
dor's nation's interests and to assert official positions before foreign courts).
246. Id. at 162.
247. Id. at 162-63.
248. See id. at 163 (interpreting provision of Ecuadoran constitution).
249. See id. (declaring that Ambassador Teran possessed apparent authority to waive
Ecuador's sovereign immunity) (citing First Fid. Bank, NA. v. Gov't ofAntigua & Barbuda -
Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 193 n.2, 194 (2d Cir. 1989) (employing agency law
principles to determine whether Antigua's ambassador possessed apparent authority to borrow
money and to agree to consent order which waived Antigua's sovereign immunity and obligated
government ofAntigua to repay borrowed funds)).
250. Id. at 155.
251. Id. at 163.
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from suit in domestic U.S. adjudications. 2 The court, inHeaney v. Govern-
ment of Spain,253 decided the issue concerning whether the government of
Spain and its consular representative were immune from suit in a United States
court based upon a breach of contract cause of action.' The plaintiffwas an
American attorney who represented a group of Northern Ireland residents in
civil rights litigation against the United Kingdom before the Human Rights
Commission ofthe Council of Europe. 5 The plaintiff alleged that the govern-
ment of Spain, desiring to embarrass Great Britain through the exposure of
alleged civil rights abuses as part of a Spanish effort to expel the British gov-
ernment from neighboring Gibraltar, contracted for the services ofplaintiff
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the Spanish government hired plaintiff
to publicize "on a world wide basis" the British government's suppression of
civil rights and the lack of free elections in Northern Ireland, targeting in
particular the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the United States
Congress. 7 When the Spanish government refused to reimburse the plaintiff
for his services, the plaintiffbrought an action against Spain and its Consular
General for breach of contract inthe Western District of New York."
252. See Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that Spanish
government and its consular representative were immune from suit by virtue of sovereign and
consular immunity for breach of contract with American attorney to reimburse attorney $50,000
for his efforts to publicize British suppression of civil rights in Northern Ireland).
253. 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971).
254. See Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming that Span-
ish government and its consular representative were immune from suit by virtue of sovereign
and consular immunity for breach of contract with American attorney to pay $50,000 in return
for his efforts to publicize British suppression of civil rights in Republic of Northern Ireland).
In Heaney, the Spanish government allegedly contracted for the services of the plaintiff; an
American attorney, to globally publicize British civil rights abuses in Northern Ireland in order
to further Spanish efforts to expel the United Kingdom from neighboring Gibraltar. Id. at 502.
When the Spanish government refused to reimburse the plaintiff for his services, the plaintiff
brought an action against Spain and its Consular General for breach of contract in the Western
District of New York. Id. at 501-02. In an affidavit, Spain's ambassador to the United States
officially declined to waive his nation's sovereign immunity from U.S. adjudication of the plain-
tiff's claim. Id. at 502 n.1. The trial court subsequently granted Spain's motion to dismiss due
to lack ofjurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 502.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint Id. at 501. The court found the contract between the Spanish gov-
ernment and the plaintiff to be a diplomatic activity falling within the traditional realm of public
and political acts protected by sovereign immunity principles. Id. at 503 (citing Victory
Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d
Cir. 1964)). Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that the Spanish ambassador's affidavit
"was more than sufficient to raise the issue of immunity by motion." Id. at 506 n.5.
255. See id. at 501-02 (providing background and procedural history).
256. Id. at 502.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 501-02.
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In the lower court proceedings, Spain moved to dismiss on grounds that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based upon the doctrines of sov-
ereign and consular immunity." In support of the Spanish government's
motion to dismiss, Spain's ambassador to the United States, His Excellency
Jaime de Arguelles y Armada, submitted an affidavit asserting the Spanish
government's sovereign immunity from suit.6 Specifically, the Spanish
ambassador's affidavit stated that "I have been instructed, as Ambassador of
my country, to make known to the Court that Spain most respectfully declines
to waive its sovereign immunity or to consent to the jurisdiction of the
Court."2 The ambassador's affidavit also asserted that the Consul General
of Spain was acting in his official capacity as a representative of the Spanish
government during any meetings held with plaintiff.262 The trial court subse-
quently granted Spain's motion to dismiss on sovereign and consular immu-
nity grounds.
2 63
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the order
ofthe trial court.264 The court recognized that the contemporary rationale for
sovereign immunity is the avoidance of possible embarrassment to those
responsible for the conduct of the nation's foreign relations.""26 The Second
Circuit, in the pre-FSIA era, followed the pre-FSIA practice of granting defer-
ence to the U.S. Department of State's policy pronouncements in its determi-
nation of a foreign sovereign's scope of immunity in domestic adjudications.266
The court recognized, however, that there are several categories of "strictly
political or public acts" which plainly fall into the traditional realm protected
by sovereign immunity principles.267 Such acts include internal administrative
acts, legislative acts, acts concerning the armed forces and diplomatic activity,
and public loans.2" The court regarded the contract between the Spanish
government and plaintiff as clearly falling within the diplomatic activity
category.269 In upholding the district court's dismissal of the American attor-
ney's complaint on grounds of Spanish sovereign and consular immunity, the
259. Id. at 502.
260. Id. at 502 n.1.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 502.
264. Id. at 506.
265. Id. at 503.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-





Second Circuit noted that the Spanish ambassador's affidavit "was more than
sufficient to raise the issue of immunity by motion."27
C. Ninth Circuit: Phaneufv. Republic of Indonesia
InPhaneufv. Republic ofIndonesia,271 the Court of Appeals forthe Ninth
Circuit expressed disagreement with the Second Circuit's holding in First
Fidelity "that jurisdiction existed over the foreign state if the district court
found that the foreign state's ambassador acted with apparent authority."1
272
The Phaneufcourt addressed whether Indonesia's ambassador to Syria, Am-
bassador Mawardi, impliedly waived Indonesia's immunity from suit under
the commercial activities exception to the FSIA when he certified the validity
of promissory notes that Indonesia's National Defense Security Council
(NDSC) had purportedlyissued.2 73 Members ofNDSC created approximately
505 promissory notes worth an estimated value of over three billion U.S.
dollars. 4 Each note bore the official NDSC crest and the signature of two
members of the NDSC. 5 Hartomo, the principal maker of the promissory
270. Id. at 506 n.5.
271. 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997).
272. See Phaneufv. Republic ofIndonesia, 106 F.3d 302,308 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that foreign state's agent must have acted with actual authority in order to invoke commercial
activity exception to sovereign immunity against foreign state (citing First Fid. Bank, N.A- v.
Gov't of Antigua & Barbuda - Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 194-96 (2d Cir. 1989))). In
Phaneuf, the plaintiff brought suit in the District Court of Arizona to recover payment on
several promissory notes that the Republic of Indonesia's National Defense Security Council
(NDSC) purportedly issued. Id. at 304. Each note bore the official NDSC crest and the signa-
ture of two members of the NDSC. Id. While participating in a signing ceremony in Damascus,
Indonesia's ambassador to Syria allegedly confirmed the authenticity of the NDSC promissory
notes. Id. However, because the NDSC notes were actually worthless, the government of
Indonesia instructed its banks to refuse to honor them. Id. The Republic of Indonesia asserted
sovereign immunity from suit under the FSIA. Id. at 305. The district court subsequently
dismissed the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined the plain meaning of the
FSIA's language to determine whether the commercial activity exception applied. Id. at 307.
The court concluded that Indonesia's ambassador must have acted with the actual authority of
the Indonesian government in order to trigger the exception. Id. The commercial activity excep-
tion to sovereign immunity requires an act of the foreign state. Id. The court reasoned that
because "a foreign state acts through its agents, an agent's deed which is based on the actual
authority of the foreign state constitutes activity 'of the foreign state."' Id. at 307-08. Because
unofficial acts are not acts of the foreign state, mere apparent authority will not suffice. Id. at
308. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court in part to determine whether the ambas-
sador of Indonesia acted with the actual authority of his government when he certified the valid-
ity of the purported NDSC promissory notes. Id.
273. See id. at 304, 306 (addressing issue of whether Indonesian ambassador acted with
actual authority of Indonesian government).
274. Id. at 304.
275. Id.
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notes, traded theNDSC notes for promissory notes that a Syrian financier had
issued.276 In August 1985, Mawardi, the Republic of Indonesia's ambassador
to Syria, participated in a Damascus signing ceremonyY 7 During the signing
ceremony, Ambassador Mawardi allegedly "confirmed that Hartomo repre-
sented the Indonesian government and that the 'NDSC notes' were 'Offi-
cial/Governmental."' 278 The promissorynotes obtained fromthe Syrian finan-
cier in exchange for the NDSC promissory notes "were later discovered to be
worthless." 79 The plaintiffheld several ofthese promissory notes purportedly
issued by the NDSC. °
The government of Indonesia claimed that it was unaware of the exis-
tence of the NDSC notes until late 1985.8 The Indonesian government,
having become aware of the existence of the illicit notes, "promptly deter-
mined that these notes were unauthorized and invalid under Indonesian
law. 11 2 Subsequently, the Secretary General ofNDSC notified Bank Indone-
sia that the notes in question were invalid because "neither the NDSC nor any
of its officials had authority to issue promissory notes."283 "[The NDSC
issued a press release which disavowed NDSC responsibility for the notes,
stating that responsibility lay with the persons who signed the notes." 4 Bank
Indonesia consistently declined to honor the promissory notes in question.285
Plaintiff Phaneuf brought an action in the District of Arizona to recover
payment on the promissory notes he allegedly obtained from the NDSC.286
The Republic of Indonesia moved to dismiss Phaneuf s complaint on sover-
eign immunity grounds under the FSIA.2 7 The trial court denied the Indone-
sian government's motion to dismiss because "defendants had not established
a prima facie case of immunity under the FSIA."8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that
"[,]he FSIA is the sole basis of subject matter jurisdiction over suits involving













288. Id. at 304.
289. Id. (citing Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319,323 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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that foreign sovereigns are immune from suit under the FSIA unless one of
the FSIA's exceptions applies to the sovereign. " By examining the plain
language of the FSIA, the court reasoned that foreign nations are entitled to a
presumption of immunity in U.S. courts." Therefore, the Indonesian govern-
ment and NDSC were not required to establish a prima facie case of immu-
nity under the FSIA.'
The court found the FSIA's reference to "'a commercial activity of the
foreign state "' to be a prerequisite to invocation of the commercial activities
exception.293 Thus, for the commercial activities exception to apply, the
foreign state must engage in commercial activity. 4 In order to determine
whether the commercial activities exception applied, the court examined the
plain meaning ofthe statutory language employed in the FSIA.' s The court
reasoned that "[b]ecause a foreign state acts through its agents, an agent's
deed which is based on the actual authority of the foreign state constitutes
activity 'of the foreign state."' ' 6 When a foreign official acts beyond the
scope of actual authority, the official's acts are not authorized by the sover-
eign.' An ambassador or other government official acts beyond the scope
of his official authority when the ambassador or official engages in any
activity or performs any function that the foreign sovereign has not empow-
ered the ambassador or official to do.' Because the foreign sovereign does
not authorize such diplomatic ultra vires actions, there can be no official
foreign state activity for FSIA purposes.299 Because unofficial acts do not
constitute official activities of the foreign state under the FSIA, mere appar-
ent authority is not sufficient to bind the sovereign to the agent's actions.3"
The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded "that the foreign state retains its
immunity when its agent acts outside the scope ofhis authority."3 1 The court
further recognized that a foreign nation's issuance of public debt is a com-
290. Id. at 305-06.
291. Id. at306.
292. Id.
293. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX2X1994)).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 307 (citing Straw v. A P Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448,452 (9th Cir. 1994)).
296. Id. at 307-08.
297. Id. at 308 (citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir.
1990).
298. See id. at 306 (citing Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
FSIA applicable to foreign official acting in official capacity but not to official acting beyond
scope of official's authority)).
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mercial act falling under the commercial activities exception.3" Foreign gov-
ernment's engage in various activities through their agents.30 3 An action of
a governmental agent or representative constitutes official foreign state
activity when the agent or representative acts within the scope of government
sanctioned actual authority. °4 Thus, if Ambassador Mawardi did not possess
the Indonesian government's actual authority to certify the validity of the
bogus promissory notes, then the Indonesian government retained its sover-




The Eleventh Circuit's approach inAquamar, recognizing a presumption
of ambassadorial authority to waive sovereign immunity absent compelling
contrary evidence, best comports with the policy considerations underlying
the FSIA.3'e The FSIA was designed to provide clear standards as to when
a foreign nation may assert sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense to
suit in U.S. courts.30 7 These clear standards augment the potential for uni-
form and predictable results by eliminating the ad hoc arbitrariness that
frequently characterized sovereign immunity determinations during the pre-
FSIA reign of the Tate Doctrine.30 ' Acknowledgment of an ambassador's
inherent powers to assert or waive immunity would provide a clear rule for
courts to follow." Even if there was evidence that Ecuador's ambassador
had received permission from his government to waive sovereign immunity
in Aquamar, the Eleventh Circuit did not rely on the ambassador's actual or
apparent authority in making its ruling, but based its decision upon the
recognized presumption.
3 10
302. Id. at307 (citingRepublic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,612-17 (1992)).
303. Id.
304. See id. at 307-08 (discussing agent actions that constitute activity of foreign state).
305. See id. (holding that agent must act within actual authority of foreign state in order
for commercial activity exception of FSIA to apply).
306. See generaltyAquamar, SA. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA., 179 F.3d 1279 (1lth
Cir. 1999) (holding that under FSIA, courts should presume that ambassador possesses authority
to appear before them and waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence to contrary).
307. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976),reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A. 6604,6605
(providing legislative history of FSIA).
308. See generally supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text (describing U.S. substantive
sovereign immunity law pre-FSIA).
309. SeeAquamar, 179 F.3d at 1298 (discussing congressional intentto create uniform and
predictable standards applicable to suits involving foreign governments and their agencies).
310. See id. at 1300 (noting that President Duran Ballen of Ecuador filed affidavit with
court confirming Ambassador Teran's authorization to waive Ecuador's sovereign immunity
from suit in present case).
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Requiring courts to examine the domestic law of a foreign nation to
determine whether its ambassador may waive sovereign immunity in U.S.
adjudications would greatly hinder the uniformity and predictability so highly
valued by the framers of the FSIA.3 ' Such a judicial inquiry into the local
laws of other countries would create a significant "roadblock" in the middle
of the FSIA superhighway, impeding the progress of the American judicial
system towards the achievement of uniform and predictable results.3"2
Because individual courts are likely to be unfamiliar with the nuances of any
given foreign nation's domestic laws, hearings to interpret the meaning and
applicability of such laws would result in protracted and "frequently incon-
clusive inquiries into conflicting interpretations of foreign law."3" 3  Such
inconclusive inquiries would create the very same arbitrariness and ad hoc
decisionmaking in the judiciary that Congress sought to eliminate through the
FSIA's removal of sovereign immunity determinations from the executive to
the judicial branch.314
Various policy considerations appear to support the Eleventh Circuit's
position. Prolonged and unpredictable inquiries into whether a foreign na-
tion's ambassador possesses authority to waive immunity would decrease
judicial economy and efficiency while raising the costs of litigation for liti-
gants. Increased litigation costs, coupled with the lack of predictable results,
would likely chill potential private litigants from bringing suit against foreign
governments and their state-owned enterprises. This chilling effect would
disproportionately deter private parties with limited resources, such as small
businesses, entrepreneurs, and individual plaintiffs who lack the time, money,
and expertise to investigate the domestic law of a foreign nation before initiat-
ing suit.
The Eleventh Circuit further argued that requiring an examination of an
ambassador's actual authority in a sovereign immunity determination would
allow litigants to manipulate the process and thus functionally defeat the
FSIA's goal to eliminate party manipulation of sovereign immunity determi-
nations at the diplomatic level.3 15 A foreign state could wait until after it has
311. Id. at 1298.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Cf R.R.REP.No. 94-1487,at 7 (1976),reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604,6606
(stating that principal purpose of FSIA is to transfer determinations of sovereign immunity from
executive to judicial branch order to to reduce foreign policy implications of immunity deter-
minations and to assure litigants that such determinations are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process).
315. See Aquamar, SAV. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, 179 F.3d 1279, 1298 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citing George Kahale IL, State Loan Transactions: Foreign Law Restrictions on
Waivers oflmmunit and Submissions to Jurisdiction, 37 Bus. LAW. 1549, 1561 n.70 (1982)
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unsuccessfully defended on the merits to attempt to invoke inmmnunity.31 6 The
foreign state would thus possess an unfair advantage over private litigants,
reaping the fruits ofthe availability of adjudicating its claims in U.S. courts
while avoiding the concomitant obligations.317 The Eleventh Circuit further
reasoned that private parties opposed to the presence of a foreign state in the
litigation may attempt to persuade the court to deny the foreign state the
opportunity to appear and defend itself on the merits because the foreign
state's own law prohibits it from doing so"3 However, while private parties
may occasionally use this tactic,319 they typically seek the court to obtain
jurisdiction over foreign states so that the private parties may litigate their
claims against them.
320
The Eleventh Circuit's Aquamar decision also furthers the FSIA's goal
to bring U.S. sovereign immunity law into conformity with the laws of the
majority of nations in the international community.321 Fundamental interna-
tional law principles deem an ambassador to possess "an extraordinary role
and powers."" Such ambassadorial powers include representation of the
sending sovereign in the receiving state, protection of the interests of the
sovereign state and its nationals abroad, and representation of the sovereign
state in international organizations." s Ambassadors have also traditionally
possessed expansive authority to make decisions that bind the nations they
represent.324 The Eleventh Circuit further noted that international tribunals
have traditionally presumed an ambassador to possess the authority to offi-
cially represent the sending sovereign's positions and interests before foreign
judiciaries." Through its refusal to conduct intrusive inquiries into the
domestic laws of foreign states to determine an ambassador's authority to
(asserting that foreign state must authorize governmental officer to represent foreign state's
interests in breach of contract disputes)).
316. Id.
317. See id. (noting disadvantages from reliance on actual authority to determine whether
ambassador is authorized to waive sovereign immunity).
318. Id.
319. See id. at 1282 (noting that plaintiff shrimp farmers sought prevention of Ecuador and
PNB from joining suit to prevent removal of case to federal court).
320. See supra note 9 (collecting cases).
321. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C-.AN. 6604,
6606, 6610 (providing goals and purpose of FSIA).
322. See Aquamar, SAV. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, 179 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th
Cir. 1999) (analyzing traditional role and authority of ambassador in context of fundamental
principles of international law).
323. Id. at 1295-96.
324. Id. at 1296.
325. Id.
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waive immunity, the Eleventh Circuit promoted the FSIA goals of fostering
harmonious international relations 26 and according foreign nations treatment
in U.S. courts similar to the treatment the U.S. government would prefer to
receive in the courts of those foreign nations."2
B. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's approach to ambassadorial waiver of immunity,
however, does not further FSIA policies of uniform and predictable applica-
tion of U.S. sovereign immunity law. The First Fidelity court's application
of the forum's agency law principles to determine whether an ambassador has
apparent authority to waive immunity significantly impairs the FSIA's goal
of uniform application of U.S. sovereignimmunity law." For example, under
New York agency law, to establish apparent authority a plaintiff must demon-
strate that the plaintiff fulfilled the duty of reasonable inquiry as well as
demonstrate reliance on the principal's manifestations of the agent's author-
ity.3" Thus, whether an ambassador possesses authority to explicitly waive
his nation's sovereign immunity may entirely depend upon the forum of the
litigation or the situs of the event giving rise to suit.33 Uniformity and pre-
dictability are destroyed as courts resolve questions of ambassadorial author-
ity to assert or waive immunity on an ad hoc case by case basis.3 ' Private
litigants may be chilled from bringing suit against foreign governments and
their instrumentalities due to the uncertainty of whether they can meet the
elements of apparent authority in a particular forum.332 As Justice Newman
indicated in his dissenting opinion, a party who contracts with a foreign na-
tion's ambassador to supply goods or services "expects payment, not an op-
326. See id. at 1295 (stating that one purpose of FSIA is to promote harmonious interna-
tional relations) (citing Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477,480 (5th Cir. 1998) (dis-
cussing purposes of FSIA in context of wrongful death cause of action against Italian state-
owned manufacturer)).
327. See id. (citing Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526, 528 (E.D. Va.
1980) (noting that FSIA accords foreign nations same type of sovereign immunity U.S. gov-
ernment receives in U.S. courts as well as reciprocal immunity U.S. expects before foreign
tribunals), aff'd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981)).
328. Cf. First Fid. Bank, NA. v. Antigua & Barbuda- Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189,
197 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing for creation of uniform body of federal
law to determine authority of ambassador to waive sovereign immunity).
329. See id. at 193-94 (discussing New York agency law).
330. Cf id. at 197 (Newman, 3., dissenting) (arguing for creation of uniform body of fed-
eral law to determine authority of ambassador to waive sovereign immunity).
331. Cf. id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that foreign states are entitled to expect uni-
form body of law).
332. Cf id. at 197-99 (Newman, J., dissenting) (concluding that majority's ruling will im-
pose hardships on third parties).
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portunity to persuade a trial court that its ignorance of an ambassador's lack
of actual authority was not willful."'
The Second Circuit's approach inFirst Fidelity also impedes the FSIA's
underlying policies of promoting harmonious international relations and
comity.334 Suppliers of goods and services are likely to become unwilling to
extend creditto foreign governmental instrumentalities without making "poten-
tially intrusive and resented inquiries" into ambassadorial authority.33 The
court's ruling will jeopardize diplomatic relations with foreign governments
because such "foreign governments generally will not appreciate inquiries
from American vendors as to the authority of their ambassadors to obtain goods
or services."" After all, foreign governments send their ambassadors to the
United States, just as the United States sends its ambassadors to foreign
countries, in the expectation that their ambassadors can carry out the normal
incidents of living in the host country without undue infringement.
337
While the Aquamar court distinguished itself from First Fidelity on
grounds that the latter case involved a waiver of immunity as part of a loan
agreement and consent order, both cases are in reality very similar.3 ' Both
Aquamar and First Fidelity revolve around a foreign ambassador's waiver
of his nation's sovereign immunity to domestic adjudication before a U.S.
court.3 39 Both contemplate how to determine a foreign ambassador's author-
ity to explicitly waive sovereign immunity.340 Thus, the distinction between
these two cases truly is without a difference. In fact, the FSIA specifically
states that "[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case... in which the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.
3 41
333. See id. at 199 (Newman, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority's application of appar-
ent authority principles in determination of ambassadorial authorization to raise or waive immu-
nity will create uncertainty for potential litigants).
334. See supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text (discussing FSIA policy).
335. See First Fid. Bank, NA. v. Antigua & Barbuda - Permanent Missions, 877 F.2d
189, 199 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (exploring ramifications of application of
apparent authority to determination of ambassadorial power to waive immunity and to enter
consent decree obligating foreign state to repay loan).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See Aquamar, SA. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA., 179 F.3d 1279, 1299 (1lth
Cir. 1999) (distinguishing case from Second Circuit opinion in First Fid. Bank N. v. Govt
ofAntigua &Barbuda -PermanentMission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989)).
339. See supra notes 97-116, 163-78 (discussing background and procedural history of
Aquamar and First Fidelity cases).
340. See supra notes 97-116, 163-78 (discussing background and procedural history of
Aquamar and First Fidelity cases).
341. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994).
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Nowhere in this waiver provision does the statute mention the context sur-
rounding the explicit or implied waiver. In the FSIA's legislative history,
Congress provides two examples of an explicit waiver of sovereign im-
munity.342 A foreign state may renounce its immunity by treaty with the U.S.
or waive its immunity in a contract with a foreign party.343 The first example,
waiver by treaty, involves one of an ambassador's traditional international
functions."' The second example, waiver by contract, represents an ordinary
commercial matter.345 Congress recognized the validity of the express waiv-
ers in both examples without distinguishing between them or suggesting dif-
ferent standards for the applicability of the waivers in each scenario.346
The Second Circuit's reasoning in First Fidelity is therefore "flawed"
because it is based upon an irrelevant distinction. 47 The Second Circuit's
opinion "neither comports with the functions of ambassadors, for they con-
duct affairs in the international and domestic forums, nor does it comport
with the public's view" oftraditional ambassadorial powers.34 The paradoxi-
cal result of the court's decision is that the ambassador possesses the author-
ity to conclude international treaties but may or may not possess authority to
procure a loan to finance embassy repairs."'
The Jota case is very similar to Aquamar because both cases involve the
Ecuadoran ambassador's authority to represent his nation's position on
immunity to a domestic U.S. adjudication.35 The main difference between
342. See ELR. REP.No. 94-1487,at 18 (1976),reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CA&N. 6604,6617
(providing examples of explicit waivers).
343. Id.
344. Id.; see Aquamar, SA v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, 179 F.3d 1279, 1294-95
(1 th Cir. 1999) (exploring traditional roles and powers of ambassador).
345. See H.R.REP.No. 94-1487, at 18(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604,6617
(providing examples of explicit waivers); see also First Fid. Bank, NA v. Gov't of Antigua &
Barbuda - Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(arguing for development of federal common law on foreign states' United Nations ambassa-
dorial authority to bind foreign state in ordinary commercial matters).
346. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976),reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604,6617
(providing examples of explicit waivers).
347. Cf MichaelD.Anderson, CommentAmbasadorStatusIsOneFactorinDetermining
Agent's Authority to Waive Immunity, First Fidelity v. Government ofAntigua & Barbuda, 877
F.2d 189 (2dCir. 1989), 14 SUFFOIxTRANsNAT'LL. REv. 286,298 (1990) (critiquing Second




350. Compare Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding Ecua-
doran ambassador possessed apparent authority to assert Ecuador's sovereign immunity from
suit in U.S. domestic adjudication), with Aquamar, SA v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, 179
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Jota and Aquamar is that the Second Circuit in Jota considered whether
Ambassador Teran could assert Ecuador's sovereign immunity from suit, not
whether he could waive it.351 The Second Circuit in Jota appeared close to
adopting inherent agency principles in its determinations of Ecuador's ambas-
sador's authorization to waive sovereign immunity.352 In fact, the Jota court
acknowledged Ambassador Teran as representing the "official position" of
the Ecuadoran government in spite of the Ecuadoran legislature's and attor-
ney general's expressed intent to the contrary.5 3 However, regardless of
whether Ambassador Teran's power to assert immunity derived from actual
authorization or from authority inherent in his position as ambassador, the
Second Circuit concluded that he enjoyed apparent authority to assert sover-
eign immunity from suit on behalf of the government of Ecuador. 54 The
Second Circuit thus acknowledged that apparent authority principles applied
to an ambassador's traditional international role as well as the ambassador's
engagement in commercial matters.355 The Second Circuit's opinion in Jota
is thus firther evidence that the First Fidelity distinction between traditional
international ambassadorial authority and commercial activities is flawed in
the context of explicit waivers. Furthermore, under the FSIA, explicit waiv-
ers are valid regardless of whether they are made in a treaty or as part of a
commercial transaction.356
Through reliance on apparent authority principles to determine ambassa-
dorial authority to waive sovereign immunity in Jota, the Second Circuit
continues to undermine FSIA policies. 357 Reliance on the agency law of the
forum increases the probability for disuniformity and unpredictable results.
The Second Circuit's adherence to an apparent authority analysis also nega-
tively impacts the FSIA objectives to promote harmonious international
relations and reciprocal legal treatment abroad.
F.3d 1279, 1299 (1 th Cir. 1999) (applying presumption under FSIA principles to conclude that
Ecuadoran ambassador possessed authority to waive Ecuador's sovereign immunity from suit
in U.S. domestic adjudication).
351. See Jota, 157 F.3d at 155-58 (providing historical background and procedural history).
352. See id. at 162-63 (recognizing ambassador's traditional authority to represent foreign
state's position before domestic tribunals).
353. Id.
354. See id. at 163 (concluding ambassador possessed apparent authority to assert sov-
ereign immunity).
355. See id. (stating that ambassador has authority to bind state that ambassador repre-
sents).
356. See supra notes 342-46 and accompanying text (discussing explicit waiver exception
to general rule of sovereign immunity).
357. See supra notes 328-37 and accompanying text (exploring implications of First Fidel-
ity decision on FSMA policies).
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Perhaps the Second Circuit will soon follow the Eleventh Circuit's lead
in Aquamar and apply inherent agency law principles to future determina-
tions. In the Second Circuit's pre-FSIA Heaney decision, the court recog-
nized the authority of an ambassador to assert his nation's sovereign immu-
nity from suit.3s 8 The court noted that the Spanish ambassador's affidavit
claiming sovereign immunity from suit "was more than sufficient to raise the
issue of immunity by motion.'1319 The Second Circuit thus has along history




In Phaneuf, the Ninth Circuit expressed disagreement with the Second
Circuit's decision inFirstFidelityto apply apparent authority principles to the
determination of an ambassador's authorization to waive sovereign immunity
on behalf of the nation the ambassador represents . Specifically, the court
asserted that an ambassador must act with actual instead of apparent authority
to implicitly waive the sovereign's immunity from suit under the FSIA's
commercial activities exception.362 However, First Fidelity did not involve an
implied waiver of immunity.363 Antigua's ambassador to the United Nations
expressly waived Antigua's sovereign immunity in a domestic judicial pro-
ceeding.3' Therefore, the Antiguan ambassador's conduct fell under the
waiver provisions of the FSIA.365
The Phaneuf court's inquiry into the actual authority of an ambassador
to bind the nation the ambassador represents undermines FSIA policies.
358. See Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 502-06 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming immu-
nity of Spanish government and consular representative from suit for breach of contract with
American attorney allegedly hired to publicize British suppression of civil rights in Northern
Ireland).
359. ld.atS06n.l.
360. See id. (citing cases in agreement).
361. See Phaneufv. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302,308 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that foreign state's ambassador must act with actual authority to invoke commercial activity
exception to sovereign immunity against foreign state) (expressing disagreement with First Fid.
Bank, NA. v. Gov't of Antigua & Barbuda - Permanent Msion, 877 F.2d 189, 194-96 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
362. Id.
363. See First Fid. Bank, NA. v. Gov't ofAntigua &Barbuda -Permanent Mission, 877
F.2d 189,190-91 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that ambassador explicitly waived immunity).
364. Id.
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX1) (codifying waiver exception to sovereign immunity).
366. See supra notes 307-20 and accompanying text (examining effect on FSIA ofjudicial
inquiry into actual authority of ambassador to waive sovereign immunity).
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Such intrusive inquiries into another nation's laws detract from the unifor-
nity and predictability of the judicial process. Protracted and prolonged
proceedings would result as inexperienced courts attempt to interpret strange
and foreign laws. Because different courts are likely to reach different con-
clusions on the meaning of foreign laws, judicial determinations into an
ambassador's actual authority are likely to be arbitrary and unpredictable.
Additionally, parties to the litigation may attempt to exploit the process and
thus functionally defeat the FSIA's goal to eliminate overbearing diplomatic
manipulation in sovereign immunity determinations.
V. Conclusion
This Note concludes with a recommendation that the federal and state
judiciaries adopt the Eleventh Circuit's approach in Aquamar when making
determinations into ambassadorial waiver of a foreign state's sovereign im-
munity to adjudication in U.S. courts. Specifically, courts should presume
that an ambassador possesses the sending state's authorization to waive
sovereign immunity in domestic adjudications.367 Such presumption of an
ambassador's authority to waive sovereign immunity best comports with the
policy considerations underlying the FSIA.as
Judicial recognition of an ambassador's inherent powers to assert or
waive immunity will provide a clear rule for courts to follow and will facili-
tate the FSIA goal of establishing unambiguous standards for determining a
foreign nation's amenability to suit in a domestic forum. These clear and
unambiguous rules and standards will buttress the FSIA's pursuit of unifor-
mity and predictability in U.S. substantive sovereign immunity law. Finally,
the Aquamar approach furthers the FSIA's goal to bring U.S. sovereign
immunity law into conformity with the laws of most foreign states comprising
the international community of nations. This conformity will augment the
U.S. ability to establish and maintain harmonious relations abroad while
according to foreign nations back home in the United States the same type of
treatment the United States would expect to be accorded under their laws.
367. See Aquamar, SA. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N., 179 F.3d 1279, 1299 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that under FSIA courts should presume that foreign ambassador possesses
authority to waive sovereign immunity absent compelling evidence to contrary).
368. See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text (discussing congressional policy under-
lying enactment of FSIA).
